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Abstract
Foreign banks play progressively important roles in the banking sector in 
many developing countries. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), foreign ownership 
of banks is above 50% of the domestic banking sector and given the crucial 
role banks play in the domestic economy, the effect of their entry is questioned, 
especially in relation to domestic banking stability. We examine the impact of 
foreign bank inflows on the banking sector stability in SSA, using available data 
for the period 1995 to 2009. The study employed two econometric estimators: 
the multivariate logit and the two-step system generalised method of moment 
(GMM). The results from the two methods indicate that the presence of foreign 
banks in the domestic banking sector robustly reduces the probability of bank 
crisis. Finally, the study revealed that improvement in political institutions also 
reduces the probability of bank crisis.
Keywords: ECOWAS; SADC; Financial development; Multivariate logit; 
System-GMM.
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1. Introduction
The debate on bank internationalisation and financial stability has rekindled, 
especially after the 2007-2009 financial crisis that affected the global banking 
system. Again, given the speed of global financial integration, the trends in 
foreign bank inflows have been dramatic for the past two decades (Süer et al., 
2016). Prior economic literature focusing on the impact of foreign bank inflows 
on stabilisation of financial intermediation in host countries, pre-and post-
crisis, appear to have a mix of conclusions. On the positive note, foreign banks’ 
entry could improve the efficiency of credit delivery through modern banking 
technology that improves internal controls and risk management, stimulate 
competition and product innovation, generate increased availability of credit 
through capital injections and access to foreign capital, and reduce the economic 
impact of local bank crises (Crystal et al., 2002; Lardy, 2001; Claessens et al., 
2001; Lensink & Hermes, 2004; De Haas, 2014). On the negative note, it could 
expose the domestic banking systems to international risks and shocks (De 
Haas, 2014). In addition, international banks’ presence may cause domestic 
banks to engage in speculative actions to remain competitive (Süer et al., 
2016). From the theoretical point of view, Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and 
Perri (2013) and Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) posit that foreign banks 
can cause domestic bank instability by moving capital from economies with 
limited investment opportunities across to other investment havens. To this 
end, domestic banking instability is closely related to the activities of foreign 
banks in the domestic economy through the volatility of credit supply and the 
potential for contagion. 
The policy and academic discourse about the impact of foreign bank’s entry 
on the banking stability of host economies have been advanced in developed 
markets of Europe and emerging markets of Eastern Europe and Asia (De 
Haas, 2014). Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine the impact of 
international banking inflows on banking stability in sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, which has rarely featured in the extant debates and literature. This has 
the potential to show whether or not foreign banking inflow stimulates capital 
build-up which better capitalizes domestic banks to absorb financial shocks 
and thus increase stability in the banking sector. Foreign banking inflow as a 
strategy to promote banking stability even became more important following 
the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, when most central banks proposed a 
higher capital adequacy as a requirement for building stability in the banking 
industry (Oduor et al, 2017).
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Studies examining the effects of foreign banking inflows on the domestic 
banking sector crisis are uncommon for SSA, with the exception of Vogel 
and Winkler (2010) and Dwumfour (2017) and thus we make the following 
contributions. First, our study differs from Vogel and Winkler (2010) and 
Dwumfour (2017) as it used different specification as well as different measures 
of bank stability. For instance, we depart from Vogel and Winkler’s (2010) 
seemingly unrelated regression in a cross-sectional framework which did not 
consider the endogeneity problems in the independent variables. Second, we use 
panel data for selected sub-Saharan African countries (SSAs), up to the crisis 
period, and applied standard econometric tools that account for endogeneity 
in our model specification. Bikker and Haaf (2002) explain that appropriate 
specification of an underlying model determines the validity of estimated 
parameters. The potential misspecifications, differences in econometric 
approach and the alternative definitions of bank stability present the potential 
for generating different results and findings (Roberts and Whited, 2013). Our 
analysis found that banking inflows reduce the probability of bank instability in 
SSAs, which supports the foreign banks influx-stability hypothesis. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background, section 3 the theoretical literature while section 4 discusses the 
empirical literature and hypothesis. Section 5 deals with the description of the 
methods, the model specification, and the data. In section 6, the results are 
discussed. The final section presents the concluding remarks and the policy 
implications.
2. Background
Even though there are other types of foreign capital inflows such as foreign 
direct investment and mergers which equally constitute thought-provoking 
research areas, we concentrate on foreign banking inflow in SSA for the 
following reasons. First, the financial systems of SSA are broadly bank-based 
with mostly underdeveloped and thinly-traded stock markets. Only South Africa 
possesses a well-advanced stock market comparable to markets in advanced 
economies.1 The total assets value of the banking sector is estimated on average 
to be 90 percent of the total financial assets in the overall financial systems of 
SSAs (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). For example, in countries, such as Gambia, 
1 According to SADC-Finance and Investment Sector Coordinating Unit (FISCU) 1998, the stock market 
of South Africa ranked 17th in the world based on stock market capitalization. Others with relative 
developed markets include Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria.
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Madagascar and Mali, the banking sector contributes about 97%, 98% and 
98.7% respectively to the total assets of the fi nancial sector. These facts clearly 
mark the dominance of the banking sector in the fi nancial system of SSA.
Second, the growth in cross-border bank (foreign banks) infl ows largely 
attributed to the fi nancial sector liberalisations motivates a study on foreign 
banking infl ow in SSA. Liberalisation opens up domestic banking systems, 
thereby, improving the integration of fi nancial systems in the sub-region to the 
rest of the global fi nancial system. van Horen (2007) and Claessens and van 
Horen (2012) show evidence that net bank fl ows from developing economies 
into other developing economies and also from advanced industrialised countries 
to developing countries have increased in the form of foreign direct investments 
(FDIs) in the banking sector of SSA (World Bank, 2006). Also, international 
banks, currently, constitute close to 60% of the total banks in SSAs, with the 
number exceeding 80% in Burkina, Mali and Swaziland (See Figures 1 and 2 
as well as Table 1 in the Appendix). According to Claessens and van Horen 
(2012), loans of foreign banks, deposits and profi ts, and current market shares 
averaged almost 50% in emerging markets and developing countries and 20% in 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development’s countries.
   In addition, the total number of foreign banks in SSA witnessed an increasing 
trend from 31% to 54% for the period 1995 to 2009 (Figure 1). This suggests the 
importance of fi nancial sector foreign direct investment (FSFDI) in the banking 
industry of SSA. The above-described characteristics put into shape the reason 
SSA banking systems are of particular concern in the examination of the impact 
of foreign bank entry on the banking stability.
fIgure 1: regIonal comParIson of Percentage of foreIgn banks ownershIP among 
total banks (data from claessens and van horen, 2012)
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fIgure 2: Percentage of foreIgn banks ownershIP among total banks     
(global fInanace database, 2014) 
Against the background that the entry of foreign banks has potential 
repercussions on the hosts’ banking systems, it is worthwhile to seek to 
investigate the implications of the phenomenon on the stability of the relatively 
underdeveloped and fragile banking sectors of SSAs. More importantly, given 
that the banking sector in the region accounts for almost 90% of fi nancial sector 
assets, the stability of the sector is imperative and a major concern for banking 
supervision and regulation. Within the above context, we asked one key pertinent 
research question: has the entry of foreign banks contributed to greater domestic 
bank stability or crisis in SSAs?
3. Theoretical framework
This section addresses mechanisms through which foreign banks may affect the 
stability of the host country’s banking system. Theoretical mechanisms explain 
the fact that subsidiaries of foreign banks are not completely independent 
institutions from the parent bank or a larger bank holding company. This implies 
that the parent bank will act as the lender of last resort during the period of 
fi nancial turmoil. According to Stein (1997), such a parent bank has and manages 
an internal capital market and centralised treasury operations to allocate capital 
and liquidity over its subsidiaries. This implies that foreign banks are insulated 
against the adverse effects of a host country bank capital or liquidity shocks and 
will keep up their credit supply during domestic crises. This is known as foreign 
banking-stability view. 
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However, foreign banks can induce crises if they are more procyclical to 
changes in the host country’s macroeconomic environment. When the economic 
activities of the host country decline, the activities of the foreign bank in this 
country may be scaled down in favour of other regions whose economies are 
upturned. Alternatively, foreign banks could also react to changes in the parent 
bank’s home country. Worsening economic conditions in the home country 
can force parent banks to become capital-constrained, compelling the foreign 
banks to reduce their credit at the destination. This is described as wealth effect. 
Wealth effect could induce crises at the destination. This is foreign banking-
fragility view.
On the other hand, it can be argued that when economic conditions in the 
home country worsen, parent banks will increase their efforts to expand their 
activities abroad, since investment opportunities in the home market are scarce. 
This is known as substitution effect. When home country conditions improve, 
the opportunity costs of limiting home country lending increases and banks 
may, therefore, allocate less capital to their foreign subsidiaries (Molyneux & 
Seth, 1998; Moshirian, 2001). This scenario indicates that there is a negative 
relationship between the home country business cycle and the foreign 
subsidiary’s credit supply.
Other theories argue that entry of foreign banks into the domestic banking 
system ignites reactions in the following ways. First, in the short term, profit 
margins of the domestic banks are reduced drastically, triggering bank failures 
(Viverita et al., 2015). Second, in the long term, the overall banking sector is 
enhanced, which promotes competition (Viverita et al., 2015). Even though 
competition has the potential of promoting efficient allocation of credit, superior 
products and spurring innovation, it has become a contentious issue in the 
banking sector. To this end, two main views have arisen to explain the relationship 
between competition and stability among banks. The first view, competition-
frugality, suggests a negative effect of competition on banks’ stability (Kasman 
and Kasman, 2015; Mulyaningsih et al., 2015). This view contends that high 
level competition among banks reduces banks’ influence in the market, which 
decreases profits. As a result, banks are compelled to take risks so as to stay 
competitive. The second view, competition-stability, suggests that competition 
drives bank stability (Kasman and Kasman, 2015; Mulyaningsih et al., 2015). 
This view stresses the fact that a competitive environment reduces interest rate 
and helps curtail asymmetry information associated with bank lending, which 
brings stability.
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4. Literature review and hypothesis testing
A good number of studies have investigated the connection between financial 
liberalisation and banking crises (stability) in both developing and advanced 
economies. (For example,Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b; Levine, 
2001; De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010). While some of the studies found 
financial liberalisation to increase the likelihood of bank crises (e.g. Hellmann 
et al., 2000; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000; Glick and Hutchison, 2000; Noy, 
2004, 2005; Shehzad and De Haan, 2009; Angkinand et al., 2010), others found 
contrasting results (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b; Shehzad and 
De Haan, 2009). Some studies also found no relationship between liberalisation 
and bank crises (e.g. Bordo et al., 2001; Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002). However, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) on the determinants of banking 
crises for both developed and developing economies, argue that crises occur in 
countries with weak macroeconomic environment, such as high inflation, high 
interest rates, weak legal rules and institutions and lack of deposit insurance. 
Other studies concentrated on the investigation of the impact of foreign 
bank inflows (due to financial liberalisation) on several variables, such as bank 
competition, efficiency, profitability, among others (Barth et al., 2004 and 
Mulyaningsih, Daly and Miranti, 2015). Other strands of the literature have 
also focused on the effects of variables, such as bank competition, capital 
requirements, bank concentration, institutions, bank access, among others, on 
bank stability (e.g. Dwumfour, 2017; Oduor, et al., 2017). Studies examining 
the impact of foreign bank inflows on the domestic banking sector stability 
are comparatively uncommon for SSA. This study focuses on the impact of 
foreign bank inflows on the domestic banking sector stability of SSAs. The next 
section reviews the extant literature on foreign bank entry and domestic banking 
stability and sets up the main hypothesis for the study. 
4.1. Foreign bank entry and domestic banking stability
Empirical evidence on the effects of foreign bank’s activities on the domestic 
banking sector stability and thus financial stability is mixed and limited. This 
follows the two main hypotheses in the existing literature: “foreign banks influx-
stability hypothesis” and the “foreign bank influx-fragility hypothesis”. The 
former argues for the position that foreign banks’ inflow reduces the probability 
of banking crises and, therefore, brings stability to the financial sector of the 
host market. Selected studies that support the stability view include Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (1998), Detragiache and Gupta (2004), Arena et al. (2007), De Haas 
and van Lelyveld (2006, 2010). The foreign banks influx-fragility hypothesis, 
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on the other hand, argues that the presence of foreign banks heightens the 
probability of banking sector crises and makes the host sector fragile (De Haas, 
2014; Dwumfour, 2017). Barth et al. (2004) found that barriers to foreign-bank 
entry and foreign ownership are positively associated with bank fragility. Beck 
et al. (2003) do not support any of the two hypotheses, indicating no evidence 
of direct relationship between foreign banking activities and the probability of 
banking crisis.
4.2. Foreign banks and banking stability in SSA
Despite considerable research on foreign bank inflows and domestic banking 
stability, little can be said about the African context, with the exception of Vogel 
and Winkler (2010) and Dwumfour (2017). The former examines whether 
increases in market share of foreign banks in many emerging markets since 
the mid-1990s contribute to financial stability in the respective host countries 
during the global financial crisis. The study suggests that the stabilising impact 
of foreign banks was limited to the cross-border component of financial 
globalisation and to two regions, Eastern Europe and SSA. Only in the SSA 
region was this translated into more stable credit growth. Thus, hopes that a 
stronger presence of foreign banks might help host countries in isolating 
domestic credit from international shocks did not materialise during the 2008 
crisis. The work of Dwumfour (2017), which examined banking stability in 
SSA, posited that net interest margin is the main determinant of stability in the 
industry and that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic industry reduces 
stability, which corroborates the fragility view. However, a major concern of 
Dwumfour’s (2017) study is the reported significant and high value coefficients, 
which is an indication of specification problems. The study also excluded 
theoretically important explanatory variables, such as deposit insurance, which 
is posited as important by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Others include the ratio 
of money supply to foreign exchange reserves, which measures bank fragility. It 
tests whether banking instability occurs as a result of sudden capital outflows or 
vulnerability to a run on banks. Other relevant indicators include credit growth 
and financial liberalisation. The current study improves upon these omissions 
in the existing studies. Thus, this study contributes to the extant literature by 
focusing on the impact of foreign bank inflows on the banking stability of SSA by 
testing for either the “foreign banks influx-stability hypothesis” or the “foreign 
bank influx-fragility hypothesis”. Therefore, our main hypothesis states that;
H1. Ceteris paribus, there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between foreign banking activities on the domestic banking sector stability.
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5. Research design/ model specifi cation and data
In order to estimate the impact of foreign bank infl ows on banking stability and 
test for the stated hypothesis, we modelled banking stability (crises) as a linear 
function of foreign bank infl ows and other conditioning variables. We specify 
the following basic model:
where i is the individual country at time t and i = 1 … … … N; t = 1… … ….. 
T. εi,t is the error term and variable yit refers to banking stability captured by 
two measures. The fi rst measure is a binary variable (bankcrisis) showing 1 for 
banking crisis in country i for a particular year t and 0 for no crisis. The second 
measure is bank z-score, which measures the risk of default and is used to capture 
a bank’s probability of insolvency. The xit variable is a k-dimensional vector of 
regressors that is capable of explaining bank stability and includes foreign bank 
infl ows (fbiit). The banking crises (bankcrisis) variable can either be systemic or 
non-systemic. We consider the analysis of systemic crisis since most incidences 
of crisis experienced in SSA were largely due to credit directives and controls 
aimed at inducing economic growth.
We have eighteen bank crises episodes as shown in Table 2 in the Appendix 
resulting in seventy-two (72) observations. The countries that were hit are 
Nigeria, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, to capture the effect of 
fi nancial sector liberalisation, the study included countries without bank crises. 
In addition, we include non-crisis countries as controls and allow for the errors 
to be correlated within each country by clustering the errors.
The other variables captured by xit include fi nancial openness (fi nop), 
infl ation, credit to the private sector (Credit), real GDP per capita (rgdppc), real 
GDP growth (rgdppcgr), exchange rate (exrate), governance indicator (polity2), 
deposit insurance (depinss) and M2 to foreign exchange reserves (M2/res).
Real GDP per capita (rgdppc) is used to control for economic development, 
which is expected to reduce the tendency of banking crises in the region. Real 
GDP growth rate (rgdppcgr) was used to control for cyclical output effects. 
Furthermore, to test whether banking crisis occurs as a result of sudden capital 
outfl ows or vulnerability to run on currency, we include the ratio of M2 to 
foreign exchange reserves (M2/res). Credit to the private sector as a ratio of 
GDP (credit) is expected to correlate positively with banking crisis. Political 
institution (polity4) is supposed to reduce the likelihood of banking crisis. 
(1)
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Financial openness (fi nop) is expected to reduce the risk of banking crises, 
as it creates the opportunity for banks to access funds abroad and strengthen 
their liquidity position and, thus, ensure stability. Explicit deposit insurance 
(depinss) is included to capture reduction in banking crisis after liberalisation by 
eliminating possibility of self-fulfi lling panic analysed in the model (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). Finally, infl ation and exchange rate (extrate) are used to 
capture loss of monetary control and the impact of currency movements on 
bank fragility. We used annual data covering the period 1995-2009 for 22 SSA 
countries. This is because the main variable of interest does not extend beyond 
2009. Data is only available for these 22 countries. Detail descriptions of the 
data used are found in Table 3 in the Appendix. We estimated equation (1), using 
Multivariate Logit and the dynamic System-GMM.
5.1 The multivariate logit method
Following Laeven and Valencia (2012), we applied a multivariate logit (and 
probit for robustness check) to estimate equation (1), given that dependent 
variable (bankcrisis) is binary. In this approach, the probability that a bank crisis 
will occur is assumed to be a function of a vector of the explanatory variables 
and estimates of the crisis probability are obtained by maximising the likelihood 
function. More formally, in each period, a country could be experiencing a crisis 
(yit=1) or no crisis (yit= 0). Thus, the outcome, yit, is defi ned as:
Equation (1) is estimated by parameterising P to depend on an index function 
β'x. The conditional probability in the binary outcome model is given by:
If P(i,t) denotes banking crisis dummy variable, β is a vector of n unknown 
coeffi cients to be estimated and F (β'x(i,t)) indicates the cumulative probability 
distribution function evaluated at β'x(i,t), then, the log likelihood function of the 
model from equation (1) is:
From equation (4), the probability distribution F(.) is assumed to be logistic 
and is given by:
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variables on ln P(i,t)/(1-P(i,t)). An increase in the probability depends on the 
original probability and initial values of all independent variables and their 
coeffi cients. According to Beck et al. (2006), the estimated coeffi cients for each 
explanatory variable indicate whether an increase in the explanatory variable 
increases or reduces the probability of a bank crisis. Therefore, we present 
marginal effect estimates, which show the magnitudes of the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and bank crisis evaluated at the sample mean.
5.2. The system GMM
The alternative measure of banking stability variable is bank z-score. In using 
the z-score, the study applies System GMM technique to address the following 
problems: (i) potential endogeneity bias (ii) unobserved heterogeneity due to 
omitted variables. In addition, the dataset used in the study has a short-time 
dimension and a relatively large country dimension (T<N). This approach 
combines the fi rst difference and level equations, which yields better estimates 
than the original GMM. However, since the lagged levels are poor instruments 
for fi rst difference equations, the Arellano-Bond approach considers the 
autoregressive model, with additional regressors from equation (1), in the 
specifi cation as follows:
where uit is the error component term given by equation (7):
where yit measures bank z-score for country i at time t and uit, which is the error 
component term, includes unobserved panel effect vi and the error term εit,with 
E (εit ) = E (vi ) = E(vi εit ) = 0  for all i and t. One-period lagged of the dependent 
variable is represented by yit-1, and xit  remains as defi ned in equation (1).
To remove the panel specifi c heterogeneity effect, the GMM uses fi rst 
difference to transform equation (6) into equation (8):
By transforming the regressors through fi rst differencing, the fi xed country-
specifi c effect is removed, since it does not vary with time as in equation (9), 




2 This is because yit-1term in ∆yit-1 = yit-1- yit-2 is correlated with εit-1 in ∆εit-1= εit - εit-1and this applies to xit 
variables too (Roodman, 2009)
(9)
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Hence, the Arellano-Bond estimator is based upon the following orthogonality 
conditions:
where yit-s is suitable lags of the dependent variable which are used as instruments 
for the residuals of the differenced equation (8). To mitigate the problem of 
lagged levels as poor instruments, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) developed the System GMM. 
Furthermore, following Blundell and Bond (1998), we apply a two-step GMM 
estimator to address the problem of heteroscedascity. In the fi rst stage, this 
procedure extracts residuals from the fi rst-step estimation. In the second stage, the 
residuals are applied in estimating variance-covariance matrix. The associated 
Monte Carlo simulations show that this two-step estimator is asymptotically 
more effi cient than the one-step method. We also follow Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and include additional assumption that 
fi rst differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fi xed effects, 
and this allows the introduction of more instruments that dramatically improve 
effi ciency. In addition to the moment condition specifi ed in equation (10), 
System GMM uses the following moment conditions:
Equation (11) implies that lagged fi rst-difference of the dependent variable is 
used to construct orthogonality conditions for the error term of equation (6) in 
levels. Additional moment condition arises from lagged explanatory variables 
in levels. However, the number of instruments tends to increase exponentially 
with the number of periods.
GMM consistency depends on the validity of the instruments used as well as 
the error term of autoregressive (AR) process: AR (1) indicates serial correlation 
whereas AR (2) does not. The study, thus, uses two tests proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The fi rst test is Sargan-Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions, which is applied to obtain the validity of the instrument. The null 
hypothesis states that the instruments as a group are exogenous. Therefore, the 
higher the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen statistics, the better. The second test is 
to determine whether there exists fi rst and second order serial correlations, and 
the Arellano-Bond test is used. Finally, Bond (2002) observed that asymptotic 
standard errors of the two-step system GMM estimators tend to be too small 
while t-ratios are too big, compared to equivalent tests for similar sample sizes 
based on one-step estimators. To eliminate this potential bias, we used the 
Windmeijer (2005) fi nite sample correction for the variance-covariance matrix.
(10)
(11)
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6. Empirical findings and discussions
The sections that follow discuss the results of both the multivariate logit and the 
two-step system GMM estimates of foreign bank inflows on domestic banking 
stability. The descriptive statistics of the variables used are shown in Table 1.
table 1: descrIPtIve statIstIcs
Variables obs Mean std dev Min Max
z-score 299 13.7 9.0 -4.5 41.5
Fbi 330 57.3 24.2 3 100
Inflation 366 62.8 342.3 -9.6 4145.11
Rdgppc 374 1386.4 1663.95 188.2 6592.8
Polins 374 3.1 5.8 -9 10
Exrate 374 1792.9 25031.9 0.003 480097
rgdppcgr 374 2.0 3.9 -17.95 18.5
Finop 374 -0.7 1.1 -1.9 2.4
m2res 369 3.3 5.4 0.19 72.99
Credit 373 24.1 29.2 2.014 167.5
Depinss 374 0.14 0.34 0 1
Note: All variables are in levels. Fbi is percentage of foreign banks among domestic 
banks, credit is private credit, and finop is the financial openness index. The variable 
exrate is exchange rate, and m2res is the ratio of M2 to reserves. Finally, rgdppc is the 
real GDP per capita and rgdppcgr is the real GDP growth rate.
From Table 1, it is evident that, on average, the percentage of foreign bank 
presence in the domestic banking industry is about 57% for the period of 
the study. The mean values of the ratio of M2 to reserves and credit to the 
private sector indicate about 3% and 24% respectively. However, the maximum 
indicates about 73% for the ratio of M2 to reserves and 168% for credit to the 
private sector. The mean z-score is about 14, revealing relatively low stability in 
the banking system of the SSA region.
6.1. Impact of foreign bank inflows on banking stability, using bankcrisis
The results of the marginal effects from the multivariate logit model are 
presented in Table 2. The coefficient estimates are also shown in Table 4 in 
the Appendix. The pseudo R square ranges from 0.03 to 0.49. From Table 2, 
foreign bank presence in the region reveals a negative and significant marginal 
probability effect on banking crisis. It implies that increases in the presence of 
foreign banking in the region significantly reduce the probability of bank crisis, 
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as shown from columns 1 to 10. From columns 1 to 9, the coefficients remain 
robustly negative and statistically significant after each control variable is added 
to the model one after the other. The specifications indicate that, on average, 
increases in foreign banking inflows by one unit will reduce the probability of 
banking crisis by 0.1%. 
The results provide evidence that supports the argument that foreign banks 
reduce incidence of bank crisis (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1998; De Haas and 
Van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010). This is supported by the evidence of the existence of 
some foreign banks in the continent for many decades (e.g. Barclays, Standard 
Chartered). Overall, these results indicate that the long-run benefits from the 
presence of foreign banks in the financial system are genuine and not explained 
by a sort of omitted variable bias. This is possible because foreign banks may 
introduce know-how and good banking practices that might lead to stability 
in the sector. Additionally, it implies that the presence of foreign banks in the 
domestic banking sector may have resulted in improvements in regulations and 
supervision, transparency and instigation of domestic reforms, which are all key 
to financial stability. Thus, the results support the “foreign banks influx-stability 
hypothesis”.
Furthermore, political institutions (polity IV), real GDP per capita (rgdppc) 
and deposit insurance (depinss) all suggest inverse relationship with bankcrisis, 
as suggested by economic theory. The results indicate that these control variables 
have a robust effect in reducing bank crisis. Development in political institutions 
indicates statistical significance at 1% level from all the specifications. The 
results indicate that an improvement in democratic process and dispensation 
reduce the probability of bank crisis on average by 1%. The baseline model, 
which is column 10, indicates that democratic development decreases the 
likelihood of bank failure by about 1.2%. Intuitively, democratic development 
will include development in the rule of law and civil rights for protecting the 
banking industry from default, either from borrowers or the bank itself. In the 
same direction, Table 2 indicates that increases in real GDP per capita, which 
proxy for the level of development reduces the chances of bankcrisis. Intuitively, 
economic development, which is linked to development in the legal system, 
may reduce the level of loan default in the banking industry, which is usually 
blamed for bank crises. Studies, such as García-Herrero and Del Rio Lopez 
(2003), Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003), Beck et al. (2006) and Shehzad and 
De Haan (2009), also found such a relationship between real GDP per capita 
and bank crises.
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The result of explicit deposit insurance is in line with the expectation of the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. It indicates a reverse relationship with 
banking crisis variable. This suggests that the likelihood of bank failure is 
reduced by 7% from the baseline estimates. This means the presence of explicit 
deposit insurance in the countries that introduced it into their banking system 
minimises the possibility of self-fulfilling panics. This finding is in contradiction 
to earlier studies by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Cull et al. (2005) 
and Beck et al. (2006).
Furthermore, from Table 2, credit to the private sector as well as financial 
openness variables indicate positive effects with bank crisis. Increases in 
credit induces bank crisis, as indicated in Table 2 from columns 5 to 10 at 1% 
statistically significant levels. From this perspective, uncontrolled increases in 
credit to the private sector have the power to induce bank crisis, which is in line 
with Kindleberger’s (1978), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache’s (2005), Klomp’s 
(2010), Gwama’s (2014) and Bara et al. (2017) studies, which argue that the 
expansion of credit in upturn in the economy results in accumulation of non-
performing loans, which causes crisis. In most SSA countries there is always a 
high potential of accumulating non-performing loans, if credit risk measures are 
not keenly implemented by banks and regulators.
In addition, the financial openness indicator showed a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that it induces the chances of bank crisis and fragility. The variable 
indicates statistical significance at 5%, even though insignificance in model 5. 
On average, the results suggest that financial openness increases the probability 
of bank crisis. This introduces fragile domestic banks to intense competition, 
leading to weak banks failing, due to exposure to liquidity risk, credit risk 
and exchange rate risk. This could explain why UT Bank and Capital Bank 
are distressed and have to be taken over by Ghana Commercial Bank recently. 
In addition, the results could mean financial openness exposes developing 
countries to financial shocks through increased capital flows. The results lend 
support to the works of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Glick and 
Hutchison (2000) and Noy (2005). This corroborates “foreign banks influx-
fragility hypothesis”. However, inflation, which measures the level of control of 
monetary policy and real GDP per capita, is not statistically-significant, despite 
indicating the expected sign of reducing the likelihood of banking crisis.
Finally, the baseline estimates suggest that the vulnerability of capital outflows 
measured by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves is marginally-
significant, but negative. This means an increase in M2 reduces bank crisis 
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as shown in Table 2. Adoption of flexible exchange rate suggests negative 
inducement on bank crisis, with probability almost zero. 
To test if the results are sensitive to alternative specification and distributional 
properties, the multivariate probit model is used. The probit results, which are 
similar to the logit results in Table 2, are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
It, generally, indicates that foreign bank inflows are negative and statistically-
significant in all the specifications and point to the finding that the presence of 
foreign banks reduces the likelihood of banking crisis in the banking sector.
6.2 Impact of foreign bank inflows on banking stability, using z-score
This section discusses the extent to which bank z-score can be captured by the 
dynamics of both bank specific and macroeconomic variables. Deposit insurance 
was dropped because its inclusion may cause bias estimates, since it is a time-
invariant regressor. Following Roodman (2009) and Heid, Langer and Larch 
(2012), the instruments are collapsed, and we used two lags for the System 
GMM. The standard errors are corrected using Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample 
correction.
From Table 3, the p-values of the Sargan and Hansen J-tests for over-
identification restrictions results suggest that, in all the estimates, the 
instruments are valid. In addition, the test for the second order autocorrelation 
in the disturbance term reported by AR (2) suggests that there is no evidence for 
significant second order autocorrelation. This is in line with our expectations. 
Based on these tests, we can conclude that we have the right specification.
The results indicate that the coefficient of the lagged z-score is significant 
and positive, implying strong persistence in the risk of bank insolvency in the 
region. That is, previous bank probability of default is highly related to the 
current probability of default by banks in the region. 
Over all, the variable of interest, foreign bank inflows, is statistically-
significant and positively affects the z-score. This suggests that foreign banks’ 
entry into the domestic banking sector reduces the risks of insolvency (increases 
distance-to-insolvency) of the domestic banking sector, thereby ensuring 
a stable banking sector in the SSA region. This supports the results from the 
banking crisis variable. Comparatively, the GMM results are relatively stronger 
than the results from multivariate logit (probit) regressions. The results for the 
five specifications in Table 3 suggest that foreign banks’ presence in the region 
increases the domestic bank distance-to-insolvency. 
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table 3: results of two-steP system gmm for bank z-score



























































































































































Hansen 0.44 0.85 0.86 1.97 4.95 4.15 1.73
J-test (0.979) (0.974) (0.990) (0.962) (0.763) (0.901) (0.998)
Obs 213 213 213 211 211 211 211
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Windmeijer-Corrected robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The implication of these findings obtain from the two estimators is that the 
presence of foreign banks in the SSA region plays an integral role in decreasing 
the probability of bank crises or risks of bank insolvency, leading to financial 
sector stability and resilience. Our findings are in line with the “foreign banks 
influx-stability hypothesis”.
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Concerning the control variable, we find that development in political 
institutions positively affects bank distance-to-solvency at 5% level of 
significance, as shown by the full model. We can, thus, give credence to 
these findings that, in order to reduce the likelihood of bank crises in SSAs, 
improvement in political institutions must be sustained. The ratio of M2 to 
exchange rate reserves indicates that it reduces bank distance-to-insolvency at 
5% significance level, considering the full model (7). This suggests that bank 
exposure to currency vulnerability induces banking instability in the region. An 
increase in bank exposure to currency vulnerability in the region by 10% will 
result in decreases in bank distance-to-insolvency by about 9%. This supports 
earlier findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Klomp (2010) 
but contrary to the findings of Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003). Financial 
sector openness, real GDP per capita and inflation are, generally, not statistically-
significant in all specifications at the 5% level. Credit to the private sector shows 
positive relationship with distance-to-insolvency in all specifications, and it is 
highly significant at 1% in full specification (7), contrary to expectations.
7. Summary and conclusion
Foreign banks have progressively played an important role in the banking sector 
and, thus, the financial system development in many developing countries. 
Foreign banks hold relatively greater proportion of banking assets in SSA 
countries. To the extent that foreign banks dominate the banking industry of 
SSA economies, we examined the impact of foreign bank inflows on the banking 
sector stability in SSA.
We found that the presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking sector 
improves domestic banking stability in SSA, supporting the evidence from Latin 
America’s emerging markets (Crystal, Dages & Goldberg, 2002). Therefore, 
policy should be targeted at improving the regulatory issues on cross-border 
bank flows into SSAs. Moreover, we found indications that domestic economic 
and political conditions matter for domestic banking stability. For instance, 
stability in inflation and political institutions increases the probability of banking 
stability. We recommend that SSAs should pursue a liberalisation policy towards 
attracting more foreign banks which have high capital and liquidity to help 
strengthen and stabilise their domestic banking industry. In addition, stability in 
the political institutions which will increase the influx of foreign banks can help 
reduce the likelihood of banking crisis.
In terms of limitations, this study could not capture the diversity of the sources 
of cross-border inflows of banking activities into SSAs. Therefore, future studies 
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could focus on the diversity of the sources of the foreign banks into SSAs. 
This is relevant in uncovering the magnitude and significant of the contribution 
of each source in moderating or activating crisis in the banking sector as well 
as the overall financial system development in SSAs. For instance, a regional 
analysis could enable us detect the sources of the mitigating impact of foreign 
banks inflow into SSAs. These sources are likely to differ in terms of magnitude 
and significance due to special features of the regions.  In addition, we believe 
future research will be relevant in the area of foreign bank inflows and financial 
regulation in SSAs. This has the potential of identifying those aspects of financial 
regulations which inhibit the efficient inflows of foreign banks in some SSAs.
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Appendix
table 1: regIonal comParIson of foreIgn dIrect Inflows In the bankIng sector
















































3120 774 3894 2993 1058 4051 2805 1175 3980 2576 1334 3910
Fraction 0.8 0.2  0.74 0.26  0.7 0.3  0.66 0.37
      
East Asia 
and Pacific
254 57 311 272 64 336 289 69 358 282 95 377
Fraction 0.82 0.18  0.81 0.19  0.81 0.19  0.75 0.25





596 198 794 479 256 735 395 217 612 367 232 599
Fraction 0.75 0.25  0.65 0.35  0.65 0.35  0.61 0.39
      
SSA 213 94 307 229 135 364 209 152 361 152 181 333
Fraction 0.69 0.31  0.63 0.37  0.58 0.42  0.46 0.54
      
Developing 
Economies
 54%   50%   46.1%   47%  
Source: Own construction using Claessens  and van Horen (2012). Foreign Banks: Trends, 
Impact and Financial Stability. IMF Working paper WP/12/10 
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table 2: showIng PerIods of bankIng crIses and stabIlIty for the PerIod 1995-2011
Sn Country Episode of bank crises from 1995-2011
1 Benin 0
2 Botswana 0
3 Burkina Faso 0
4 Burkina Faso 0
5 DRC 1996 1997 1998














20 South Africa 0
21 Zambia 1995 1996   1997 1998
22 Zimbabwe 1995 1996          1997 1998 1999
23 Swaziland 1995 1996   1997 1998  1999
24 Bissau 1996 1997   1998  
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table 3: varIables, sources and descrIPtIon
Variable Description Source
Bank crisis Dummy:  1 = Bank crisis, 0 = 
no crisis
Laeven and Valencia (2012), 
GFDD (2012),  GFDD 
(2012)
Foreign banks Percentage of the number 
of foreign-owned banks to 
the number of total banks in 
an economy. Foreign bank 
is bank where 50% or more 
of its shares are owned by 
foreigners
Neeltje van Horen (2012), 
GFDD (2012)
Z-score Captures the probability of 
default of the banking system
Bankscope, Bereau van Dijk 
(2012), GFDD (2012) 
Polity2 Measures political institution 
with -10 extreme autocratic 
and +10 total democracy
PolityIV
Credit to the private Domestic credit provided by 
financial sector (% of GDP)
WDI (2014)
sector Enterprises and nonfinancial 
public entities
m2 to reserves Broad money to total reserves 
ratio
WDI (2014)
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %)
WDI (2014)
Real GDP per capita GDP at constant US (2005) WDI (2014)
Exchange rate Official exchange rate (LCU 
per US$, period average)
WDI (2014)
Deposit insurance Dummy:  1 =a country has 
explicit deposit insurance, 0 
= otherwise
Demirguc-Kunt, et.al. (2012), 
Financial liberalisation Chinn-Ito (2012)
Real GDP per capita growth GDP per capita growth 
(annual %)
WDI (2014)
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